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It is widely held that children’s linguistic input 
underdetermines the correct grammar, and that language 
learning must therefore be guided by innate linguistic 
constraints.  In contrast, a recent counterproposal holds that 
apparently impoverished input may contain indirect sources 
of evidence that allow the child to learn without such 
constraints. Here, we support this latter view by showing that 
a Bayesian model can learn a standard “poverty-of-stimulus” 
example, anaphoric one, from realistic input without a 
constraint traditionally assumed to be necessary, by relying on 
indirect evidence. Our demonstration does however assume 
other linguistic knowledge; thus we reduce the problem of 
learning anaphoric one to that of learning this other 
knowledge.  We discuss whether this other knowledge may 
itself be acquired without linguistic constraints. 
Keywords: language acquisition; poverty of the stimulus; 
indirect evidence; Bayesian learning; syntax; anaphora.  
Introduction 
Language-learning children are somehow able to make 
grammatical generalizations that are apparently unsupported 
by the overt evidence in their input.  Just how they do this 
remains an open question.  One influential proposal is that 
children succeed in the face of impoverished input because 
they bring innate linguistic constraints to the task. This 
argument from poverty of the stimulus is a long-standing 
basis for claims of innate linguistic knowledge (Chomsky, 
1965). An alternative solution is that the learner instead 
relies on indirect evidence (e.g. Landauer & Dumais, 1997; 
Reali & Christiansen, 2005), rather than requiring innate 
linguistic constraints. We pursue this idea here, and focus in 
particular on what can be learned by noting that certain 
forms systematically fail to appear in the input.  In exploring 
this idea, we assume a rational learner that is sensitive to the 
statistical distribution of linguistic forms in the input. 
Noun phrase structure and anaphoric one  
An established example of the argument from poverty of the 
stimulus concerns the anaphoric use of the word one (Baker, 
1978; Hornstein & Lightfoot, 1981). The learning challenge 
is to determine the antecedent of one within a hierarchically 
structured noun phrase.1 Concretely, the problem facing the 
learner is illustrated in (1), below. The antecedent of the 
anaphor one is ambiguous in that one could refer to 3 
different levels of noun phrase structure, shown in Figure 1: 
(a) the upper N', referring to a yellow bottle, (b) the lower 
N', referring to a bottle of some unspecified color, or (c) N0, 
also referring to a bottle of some unspecified color.   
 
1. Here’s a yellow bottle. Do you see another one? 
[NP a [N' yellow [N' [N0 bottle] ] ] ] 
 
NP
                                                          
                 
1 A separate interesting question is how the child comes to know in 
the first place that language is hierarchically, not just sequentially, 
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odel that acquired this general knowledge from child-
eech, without any prior bias favoring hierarchical 
e pursue the same general principles here in learning 
 of this hierarchical structure is the antecedent of 
ne. 
the right answer, and how can a child acquire that 
?  It is generally accepted that one can take any 
uent as its antecedent (Radford, 1988).  For 
 example (1), one is usually taken to refer to a 
tle; thus the preferred antecedent here is the upper 
e below for more general treatment).   Lidz, 
and Freedman (2003) showed that 18-month-old 
en sentences like (1), looked longer at a yellow 
 at a bottle of a different color, which they 
 to mean that the infants knew that one here took 
as its antecedent.  Lidz et al. (2003) also searched 
child language corpus for input that, in a single 
, could unambiguously rule out incorrect 
.  They found that such input was effectively 
 the corpus. They argued that this poverty of the 
 
stimulus implicated innate syntactic knowledge: children 
know something about language that they couldn’t have 
learned from the input, so at least part of the knowledge 
must be innate.  In particular, they argued that learning is 
innately constrained to exclude the [N0] hypothesis from 
consideration. 
However, Regier and Gahl (2004) showed that a simple 
Bayesian model could learn the [upper N'] solution for such 
sentences, given only input of the form shown in (1), 
without this constraint.  Thus, after learning, their model 
qualitatively matched the behavior of the children Lidz et al. 
had tested. Their demonstration relied on a simple domain-
general principle: hypotheses gradually lose support if the 
evidence they predict consistently fails to appear. Here, if 
either [N0] or [lower N'] were the correct choice, we would 
expect to see utterances like (1) sometimes spoken in 
contexts in which one referred to a non-yellow bottle. But 
since the correct antecedent for this utterance is the upper 
N', such evidence will not appear, and that absence of 
evidence can drive learning, in a gradual rather than one-
shot fashion.  Regier and Gahl (2004) argued on this basis 
that it is not necessary to posit an innate exclusion of the 
[N0] hypothesis, contra Lidz et al.  More broadly, they 
argued that investigations of the poverty of stimulus should 
attend closely to what is absent from the input, as well as 
what is present (Chomsky, 1981:9). 
In response, Lidz and Waxman (2004) argued that Regier 
and Gahl’s model is inadequate in two important ways. 
First, the input it received was not realistic: it was given 
only determiner-adjective-noun NPs as input, whereas the 
vast majority of uses of anaphoric one have an antecedent 
NP that does not contain an adjective. Second, and more 
fundamentally, they argue that the model learned the wrong 
thing. The model learned to support the [upper N'] 
hypothesis only, whereas as stated above, more generally 
anaphoric one can substitute for any N' constituent. For 
instance, as they noted, and as shown here in (2), one can 
also substitute for the lower N': 
 
2. Here’s a yellow bottle. Do you see a blue one? 
[NP a [N' yellow [N' [N0 bottle] ] ] ] 
 
This critique represents a slight shifting of the goalposts, 
since the Lidz et al. (2003) experiment itself, to which 
Regier and Gahl responded, suggested that children interpret 
one as anaphoric to the upper N' in the context of (1) – and 
the experiment did not speak to the more general [any N'] 
hypothesis. Still, since adults do know that the correct 
answer is [any N'], it is reasonable to require that an 
adequate model explain how that knowledge is learned.  
This requirement is especially troublesome for Regier and 
Gahl’s (2004) model, since that model based its 
discrimination among hypotheses on referential grounds, by 
noting the color of the real-world bottle when sentences like 
(1) were uttered. And referentially, nothing distinguishes a 
situation in which the antecedent of one is the lower N' from 
a situation in which it is N0, since the referenced object can 
be a bottle of any color. This is a problem because the lower 
N' situation is consistent with the correct hypothesis [any 
N'] while the N0 situation is not. 
Since referential evidence will not suffice to learn the 
correct [any N'] hypothesis, what sort of evidence might? 
We know that one cannot be anaphoric to N0 because, as 
shown in (3), it is ungrammatical for one to be anaphoric 
with a complement-taking noun (side) without its 
complement (of the road, a prepositional phrase in argument 
slot, Radford, 1998; Lidz & Waxman, 2004). 
 
3. *I’ll walk by the side of the road and you can walk 
by the one of the river.   
[NP the [N' [N0 side] [PP of the road] ] ] 
[NP the [N' [N0 one] [PP of the river] ] ] 
 
Such unacceptable complement structures contrast with 
modifiers. In (4), which has a noun with a post-nominal 
modifier, it is grammatical for one to be anaphoric with the 
noun (ball) without its modifier (with stripes). In syntactic 
structure this is reflected by the modifier attaching to the 
lowest N' rather than N0.  
 
4. I want the ball with stripes and you can have the 
one with dots.  
[NP the [N' [N0 ball]] [PP with stripes] ] 
[NP the [N' [N0 one]] [PP with dots] ] 
 
Thus, if the language-learning child had grasped the 
distinction between complements and modifiers, that 
distinction could serve as a basis for learning about 
anaphoric one.  
This idea inverts a standard linguistic test (e.g. Radford, 
1988: 175), in which the acceptability or unacceptability of 
substituting one in an NP is used to determine whether a 
given post-nominal phrase within the NP is a complement 
or a modifier, as in examples (3) and (4). There is an 
apparent circularity in this: we can use the acceptability of 
substituting anaphoric one to determine whether a phrase is 
a complement or modifier – but we need the distinction 
between complements and modifiers to learn the correct use 
of anaphoric one in the first place. This circularity is only 
apparent, however, since complements may be distinguished 
from modifiers on semantic and conceptual grounds, as we 
discuss below.  We assume that the child is able to use 
semantic/conceptual information to begin distinguishing 
between complements and modifiers.  
In this paper, we address both of the criticisms that Lidz 
and Waxman (2004) directed at the Regier and Gahl (2004) 
model. We show that a different Bayesian model can learn 
the correct [any N'] hypothesis given realistic input, without 
innately excluding the [N0] hypothesis.  In doing so, we 
provide further support for the central claim of Regier and 
Gahl (2004): that by relying on indirect negative evidence, a 
child can learn the knowledge governing anaphoric one, 
without the allegedly necessary innate linguistic constraints.  
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Model 
We assume a rational learner that assesses support for 
hypotheses on the basis of evidence using Bayes’ rule: 
 
)()|()|( HpHepeHp ∝  
 
Here H is a hypothesis in a hypothesis space, and e is the 
observed evidence.  The likelihood p(e|H) is the probability 
of observing evidence e given that hypothesis H is true, and 
the prior probability p(H) is the a priori probability of that 
hypothesis being true. To flesh this general framework out 
into a model, we need to specify the sort of evidence that 
will be encountered, any general assumptions, the 
hypothesis space, the prior, and the likelihood. 
Evidence 
The model observes a series of noun phrases, drawn from 
child-directed speech.  Each noun phrase is represented 
without hierarchical structure, as a sequence of part-of-
speech tags (e.g. the big ball would be coded as “determiner 
adjective noun”), supplemented with a code for a modifier 
or complement, if any (e.g. side of the road would be coded 
as “noun complement”). This source of evidence was 
chosen because (1) children receive a steady supply of such 
input, and (2) following our discussion above, it is linguistic 
data of this sort, rather than the real-world objects to which 
anaphoric one may refer, that can discriminate among the 
relevant hypotheses. 
Assumptions  
We made three assumptions about the knowledge available 
to the language-learning child. First, following Lidz et al. 
(2003), we assumed that the child is able to recognize 
anaphoric uses of one. Second, we assumed that the child 
knows a fundamental fact about pronouns generally, 
including one: that a pronoun effectively substitutes for its 
antecedent, and must therefore be of the same syntactic type 
as the antecedent. Thus, if the pronoun occupies an N' 
position within its noun phrase, the antecedent must 
similarly occupy an N' position in its noun phrase, for 
otherwise the pronoun would not be able to substitute for 
the antecedent. By the same token, if the pronoun occupies 
an N0 position, the antecedent should, too. Critically, given 
this assumption, the problem of determining whether the 
antecedent of one is N' or N0 reduces to the problem of 
determining whether one itself, within its own NP, takes the 
role of N' or N0. We felt justified in making this assumption 
since the knowledge we assumed concerns pronouns 
generally, and could be learned by observing the behavior of 
pronouns other than one. 
Finally, we assumed that the child is able to recognize and 
distinguish between complements and modifiers when they 
appear in the child’s linguistic input. To our knowledge, 
there are no studies that have tested whether young children 
are indeed sensitive to this distinction, but we felt justified 
in making this assumption since the core distinction 
between complements and modifiers can be captured in 
semantic or conceptual terms, and thus could in principle be 
learned without innate specifically syntactic constraints. A 
complement is necessarily conceptually evoked by its head. 
For instance, member necessarily evokes the organization of 
which one is a member; so in member of congress, the 
phrase of congress is a complement. In contrast, a modifier 
is not necessarily evoked by its head. The word man does 
not necessarily evoke conceptually where the man is from, 
whether he has long hair, etc.; so in man from Rio, the 
phrase from Rio is a modifier, not a complement (Baker, 
1989; Bowen, 2005; Keizer, 2004; Taylor, 1996).  While 
there are more subtle intermediate cases, this is the 
conceptual core of the distinction.  
We return in the discussion to the question of just how 
much of our argument hangs on these assumptions. 
Hypothesis space 
We assumed a hypothesis space containing two hypotheses 
which addressed the question “Which of the constituents of 
the NP does anaphoric one take as its antecedent?” The two 
hypotheses are [any N'], and [N0].  Thus, we chose the 
simplest possible hypothesis space that includes both the 
correct answer [any N'] and the hypothesis that Lidz et al. 
argue must be innately excluded if learning is to succeed 
[N0]. If a rational learner can learn the correct answer given 
this hypothesis space and realistic input, that outcome will 
indicate that the posited innate exclusion of [N0] is 
unnecessary.  
Each hypothesis takes the form of a grammar that 
generates a string of part-of-speech tags corresponding to a 
noun phrase. The two grammars are identical except for one 
rule. Each grammar contains the following productions, 
with options separated by “|”:   
 
NP → Pro | Nbar | Det Nbar | Poss Nbar 
Poss → NP ApostropheS | PossPronoun 
Nbar → Poss Nbar | Adj Nbar | Nbar Mod 
Nbar → Nzero | Nzero Comp 
Det → determiner 
Adj → adjective 
PossPronoun → possessive-pronoun    
ApostropheS → apostrophe-s 
Mod → modifier 
Comp → complement 
Nzero → noun 
Pro → pronoun 
 
In addition to these productions, the [any N'] hypothesis 
contains the production: 
 
Nbar → anaphoric-one, 
 
while the N0 hypothesis instead contains the production  
 
Nzero → anaphoric-one. 
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Thus, the two grammars embody, in their last production, 
the link between one and either N' or N0. The grammars 
were designed to be able to parse noun phrases in a child-
language corpus. Each production in each grammar has a 
production probability associated with it, and these 
probabilities may be adjusted to fit the observed corpus. 
Prior 
The two grammars are equally complex: they differ only in 
one production, which is itself equally complex in the two 
cases. Since grammar complexity gave no grounds for 
assigning either hypothesis greater prior probability, we 
assigned the two hypotheses equal prior probability p(H): 
p(N0) = p(any N') = 0.5. Thus, all discrimination between 
hypotheses was done by the likelihood. 
Likelihood 
Given a hypothesis H in the form of a grammar, and 
evidence e in the form of a corpus of noun phrases, we used 
the inside-outside algorithm2 to obtain a maximum 
likelihood fit of the grammar to the corpus. This algorithm 
iteratively reestimates production probabilities in the 
grammar so as to maximize the probability p(e|H) that the 
corpus e would be generated by the grammar H.  Given the 
prior and likelihood, we then obtained the probability of 
each grammar given the corpus, p(H|e), using Bayes’ rule. 
Both grammars were designed to be consistent with all 
noun phrases in our corpus. What differs between the 
grammars is the expected observations given that a 
hypothesis is true. To see why this is the case, consider the 
interaction of two rules from the N0 grammar: [Nbar → 
Nzero Comp], and [Nzero → anaphoric-one]. Together, 
these two rules produce strings of the form “one + 
complement”, as in (3) above. Thus the N0 hypothesis 
predicts that such strings will be encountered in the input. 
But since such strings are ungrammatical, that expectation 
will not be fulfilled. In contrast, the N' hypothesis does not 
give rise to this false expectation, since it lacks the second 
rule. This difference between the two grammars is captured 
in their likelihoods. If no instances of “one + complement” 
appear in the input, the N0 grammar will progressively lose 
support, and the learner will select the N' grammar as the 
correct hypothesis. 
Data 
We selected as our input data source the Nina corpus 
(Suppes, 1974) in the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 
2000), which Lidz et al. (2003) had consulted.  The corpus 
was collected while the child was 23-39 months old, and 
consists of just over 34,300 child-directed mother 
utterances, containing approximately 60,000 noun phrases, 
which we identified preliminarily using a parser.3 From 
                                                          
2 We used the code made publicly available by Mark Johnson at 
http://www.cog.brown.edu/~mj/Software.htm 
3 We used the Stanford Parser, version 1.5.1, available at 
http://nlp.stanford.edu/downloads/lex-parser.shtml. 
those noun phrases we selected a random 5%, 10%, and 
15% cumulative sample for further coding by one of the 
authors (SF).  These percentages yielded samples large 
enough for our purposes, yet small enough to code by hand.   
We coded each noun phrase as a sequence of part-of-
speech tags, without hierarchical structure, e.g. “determiner 
adjective noun”, “determiner noun”, “pronoun”, etc., of the 
sort generated by the above grammars. We used these 
corpus data in two ways. First, we designed both grammars 
to accommodate these data. Second, we provided the data as 
input to the model. While both grammars were designed to 
be consistent with the data, we were interested in finding 
which grammar fit the data most closely. 
We also coded whether a complement or modifier (or 
neither) was present. Thus, for example, the noun phrase a 
piece of cheese would be coded “determiner noun 
complement”, while crackers with cheese would be coded 
“noun modifier”. We limited ourselves to post-head 
complements and modifiers in the form of prepositional 
phrases or clauses (Bowen, 2005; Keizer, 2004; Radford, 
1988). To identify a complement or a modifier we used the 
conceptual intuition described earlier, identified by several 
sources. The head noun that takes a complement 
presupposes some other entity which must be expressed 
(Huddleston & Pullum, 2002:221; Taylor, 1996:39, see also 
Fillmore’s “inalienably possessed nouns”, 1965) or inferable 
from context (Bowen, 2005:18, Keizer, 2004). To classify 
post-head strings that followed anaphoric one, such as the 
one in the picture, we identified the head noun of the 
antecedent NP from the transcript, and applied the same test 
as for nouns.  Note that the head noun is the same regardless 
of whether N' or N0 is the correct hypothesis, so this coding 
does not depend on knowing the correct hypothesis. 
We did not use substitution of anaphoric one as a test for 
classifying the post-head forms, to avoid the circularity 
alluded to above. We restricted ourselves to the conceptual 
distinction that could lead a child to the complement-
modifier distinction without requiring prior syntactic 
knowledge of anaphoric one. However, we did find post hoc 
that the anaphoric one test for count nouns4 yielded results 
consistent with the criteria we adopted.  
 
Table 1: Frequency counts of post-head structures in the 
input for 5%, 10%, and 15% cumulative samples  
 
Noun phrase forms 5% 10% 15% 
noun 1253 2478 3752 
pronoun 1605 3213 4784 
anaphoric one 13 32 49 
noun + complement 29 47 65 
noun + modifier 66 113 161 
noun + complement + modifier 0 1 1 
anaphoric one + modifier 3 3 4 
 
                                                                                                  
 
4 Anaphoric one does not substitute for mass nouns.  
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Table 1 shows a summary of the types of noun phrase 
forms available in the input, focusing on the post-head 
structure (none, complement, modifier). Following a head 
noun we found complements (piece of a puzzle, your side of 
the road) and modifiers (food for the llamas, the ocean 
beach with big waves), while following anaphoric one we 
found only modifiers (the one with the girl, the other ones 
you like), consistent with an adult-state grammar. The 
complements were all prepositional phrases, while the 
modifiers consisted of prepositional phrases or subordinate 
clauses.  
To explore what data are critical to learning anaphoric 
one, we also created two variants of the 15% sample: the 
first variant (the “no-ones” corpus) was stripped of all NPs 
containing anaphoric one, while the other variant (the “no-
complements” corpus) was stripped of all NPs containing a 
complement. We refer to the 15% sample as “the full 
corpus”. The no-ones, no-complements, and full corpora 
contained 8763, 8750, and 8816 NPs respectively.  Thus, 
the manipulations removing instances of one or 
complements each eliminated only a very small proportion 
(0.6% and 0.8%, respectively) of the “full corpus”.  
Methods 
We first calculated the probability of each hypothesis ([N0], 
[any N']), given the 5, 10, or 15% samples, corresponding to 
4.2, 8.4, and 12.6 hours of mother input, respectively. We 
then re-calculated the same probabilities on the no-ones and 
no-complements corpora. 
Results 
Figure 1 shows that the probability of the correct [any N'] 
hypothesis is equal to that of the incorrect [N0] hypothesis 
prior to observing any data (0 hours of input). However, as 
more data are seen, the probability of the correct hypothesis 
given those data grows steadily higher, at the expense of the 
incorrect hypothesis. This indicates, contra the poverty-of-
stimulus argument, that a rational learner can discover that 
the antecedent of one is N', even though N0 is not innately 





























Figure 1: Probability of hypotheses given varying 
amounts of mother input.  
Why does this happen? The N0 hypothesis falsely predicts 
that the input will include strings containing “one + 
complement”, while the N' hypothesis does not. Thus, the 
likelihood of the actual observed data is higher for the N' 
hypothesis.  As we have seen, the false N0 prediction arises 
from the interaction of two rules in the N0 grammar: [Nbar 
→ Nzero Comp], and [Nzero → anaphoric-one]. The first 
production is shared with N', while the second is not. The 
probabilities of both productions must be substantial, since 
the corpus contains complements, which require the first 
rule, and instances of one, which require the second. 
However, if the corpus lacked either one (e.g. the no-ones 
corpus), or complements (e.g. the no-complements corpus), 
the corresponding rule would receive 0 probability in a 
maximum likelihood fit to the data. In such cases the N0 
hypothesis would not make the false “one + complement” 
prediction, and there would be nothing to distinguish N0 
from N'. These expectations were confirmed, as shown in 



























Figure 2: Probability of hypotheses given the full corpus, 
and same corpus stripped of one, or of complements. 
 
Thus, the successful learning we see on the full corpus is 
dependent on the interaction of anaphoric one and 
complements. When both appear in the corpus, even in very 
modest quantities as was true here, the N0 hypothesis falsely 
predicts the unattested “one + complement” pattern, and is 
penalized for its absence. This interaction supports learning 
without the innate exclusion of N0.  
Discussion 
We have shown that a rational learner can learn the 
behavior of anaphoric one without a linguistic constraint 
that has been held to be necessary, and necessarily innate.  
Our demonstration relies on learning from the absence of 
predicted input patterns, a form of indirect evidence that is 
broadly consistent with other recent work emphasizing the 
power of indirect evidence in countering standard poverty-
of-stimulus arguments (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Reali & 
Christiansen, 2005).  
We anticipate a number of objections to our 
demonstration. First, our hypothesis space is very restricted, 
containing just two hypotheses. One might concede our 
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point that N0 need not be excluded from consideration, 
contra the standard argument, but then counter that we 
ourselves use a very constrained space. Thus, perhaps the 
fundamental “constrained space” idea is correct, even if the 
excluded-N0 proposal was not. We consider it self-evident 
that the space must be constrained; the critical question is 
whether the constraints are specifically linguistic. Will our 
demonstration scale up in a hypothesis space that is 
constrained only by non-linguistic general cognitive 
considerations? We consider that an open and interesting 
question.  
A related possible objection is that we have assumed a 
good deal of linguistic knowledge: for instance, knowledge 
that pronouns substitute for their antecedents, that language 
is hierarchically structured, and knowledge of the 
complement-modifier distinction. This is true. Our primary 
contribution has been to reduce the problem of learning 
anaphoric one to the problem of learning this other 
knowledge.  The critical subsequent question is whether this 
knowledge that we have assumed can itself be learned 
without innate linguistic constraints (e.g. Perfors et al., 2006 
show that the hierarchical structure of language may be 
learned without prior bias). If this knowledge we have 
assumed can be so learned, a standard poverty-of-stimulus 
example will have been shown to be learnable without 
specifically linguistic constraints. If not, the example of 
anaphoric one will retain its status as an argument for innate 
linguistic knowledge – but we will have shown that the 
critical linguistic constraints lie elsewhere than traditionally 
imagined. 
Perhaps the broadest potential objection is that it may 
seem wrong-headed – or paradoxical – to argue against the 
nativist poverty-of-stimulus claim while using structured 
linguistic representations of exactly the sort commonly 
proposed by nativists. We see no problem here. We consider 
ourselves to be working “from the inside out.” We start with 
linguistic representations that a nativist should recognize, 
and show that domain-general principles support learning of 
the nominally correct grammar, contra specific 
unlearnability claims in the literature. This allows us to 
engage the poverty-of-stimulus argument in its own 
representational terms, while working “outwards” to 
domain-generality. In contrast, connectionist studies that 
also question the poverty of the stimulus (e.g. Reali & 
Christiansen, 2005) work “from the outside in.” They start 
with domain-general representations, and learn linguistic 
behavior similar to that of a grammar. The two approaches 
complement each other: the starting-point for connectionist 
studies is undeniably domain-general, while in our case that 
which is learned is undeniably a grammar.  
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